Hack wrote:There was also mention that Spain pinched a penny when finishing off the line. Instead of re-grading to accommodate higher speed, they opted to keep the original ROW intact, replacing track and increasing super-elevation only. ... , but as it was mentioned above, this was an accident waiting to happen.
I've spent the better part of the day thinking about this before responding; and having thought about it a while, I'd like to offer a few comments.
While I take your point, the wreck site was, after all, 4Km (2.5 miles) outside the station. Most of the high speed railroads I'm familiar with would have begun to slow their trains substantially by that time, if for nothing else than for the sake of passenger comfort. The French TGV system was a pioneer in tying high speed lines into conventional infrastructure - originally, to avoid the excessive cost of running new rights of way through heavily developed areas, which financially crippled the early Shinkansen program, for example - and they've handled multiple instances of this with an impeccable safety record. A good many civil engineers I know would comment that substantial infrastructure improvement - particularly realignment - might be uneconomical because the rail movements would be (or at least should be) operating at a diminishing rate of speed in order to make the station stop. Whether the officials in charge of the (re)construction of the junction with the high speed line in fact ignored the judgement of professional engineers and opted to forgo additional improvements to the junction because of the cost is a very crucial question - to my mind, at least - and may have a substantial bearing on the culpability for this incident.
Something as simple as stepping down the speed limit over the course of 3Km or so, such as Amtrak does on the NEC, would have been a simple and easily-implemented response to the situation, given that the rail union is quoted as having seen the danger and having complained about it repeatedly. The old New Haven guys that taught me the business, over four decades ago, probably would have regarded such as step as unnecessary, since they expected you to know the railroad well enough to know where the speed restricted curves were, and to begin slowing down for them a safe distance out (among a broad range of other things) before you was ever considered qualified for promotion to engineer, or, for that matter, to operate on a new division, regardless of your seniority. Of course, these were old school railroad men teaching old school railroading, and we live in a different age (NOTE: there is no sarcasm intended here): the perception of responsibility and liability have changed substantially since then, as has the way incidents such as these are reported and discussed. That said, the very existence of a security camera within the right of way at that particular location suggests that all parties were aware of a potential problem of overspeed operation, and that all parties agreed there was a need to monitor compliance with established procedures.
Another point that has been discussed very little, and only in a very small audience, is the question of equipment failure. These are machines, and machines can break. We are fortunate to live in a time in which our machines, for the most part, are far more reliable than they ever have been. However, any failure of the lineside signal system and/or any of the control and safety systems in the power car could have initiated the cascading series of failures so horrifically in evidence in the video. The more sophisticated a system gets, the more it becomes vulnerable to what might be an otherwise insignificant component failure. This why most commercial aircraft systems - particularly the most crucial of them - tend to be triple redundant these days. Yes, it is possible that this was operator error; but it is also possible that the operator was rendered as helpless and terrified as the passengers because of the extremely unlikely failure of a simple component.
It is - or at least should be - safe to say that it is too early to draw conclusions about what actually happened because there is to much tragedy and to little hard evidence. It's tempting to chalk it up to operator error because that tends to figure heavily in wrecks that aren't caused by track faults or other external causes, but as I recently read on another blog, "... reality is often more interesting and more complex than such stereotypes." It is at least possible (IMHO probable) that a number of things contributed to this. I'm sure it will be a while before we see or here anything definitive.